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Appreciating the Renminbi 
 
Abstract 
International pressure to revalue China’s currency stems in part from the expectation that 
rapid economic growth should be associated with an underlying real exchange rate 
appreciation.  This hinges on the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, which sees growth as 
stemming from improvements in traded sector productivity and associated rises in wages and 
non-traded prices.  Yet, while evidence on China’s productivity and prices supports this 
hypothesis, its real exchange rate has shown no long run tendency to appreciate.  The use of a 
global numerical model allows extensions of the hypothesis, including failures of the law of 
one price for tradable goods, which point to WTO accession trade reforms and China’s high 
saving rate as key depreciating forces since the late 1990s.  With a continuing flat trajectory 
for the underlying real exchange rate in prospect, the same model is then applied to the 
implications of premature nominal (renminbi) appreciation.  It is shown that, unless this is 
achieved in association with the repatriation of foreign reserves, which would require thus far 
unavailable financial depth in the Chinese economy, unilateral RMB appreciation would be 
destructive of both Chinese and global interests. 
 
1 Introduction 
China’s apparently low Renminbi (RMB) is now very prominent in political debates over 
current account imbalances.  This is particularly so in the US, where the Congress is 
considering a draft bill to penalise China unless it revalues.
i  In more scholarly circles, while a 
few, including McKinnon (2006), argue that a RMB appreciation would not address the 
imbalances of concern to the US, numerous studies have supported the view that the currency 
is undervalued, by margins ranging from ‘small’ to as high as 50%,
ii and a number conclude 
that a unilateral appreciation of the RMB is essential.
iii  Expectations that China’s underlying 
real exchange rate should be appreciating are based commonly on the Balassa (1964) – 
Samuelson (1964) hypothesis.  This implies a positive relationship between economic growth 
and the underlying real exchange rate, driven by productivity catch-up in developing 
countries’ tradable sectors and, in association, rising wages and prices in their non-traded 
sectors.  Evidence in support of these suppositions in the case of China lends weight to the 
expectation that the real exchange rate should be appreciating.
iv  Yet, during the decade and a 
half to 2006, when the economy grew at between eight and ten per cent per year, there was no 
significant long term appreciating trend. 
The resolution of this puzzle requires a number of generalisations of the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis; most significant amongst which is the relaxation of the assumption that the law of 
one price applies for all traded goods.  This greatly broadens the set of determinants of the 
real exchange rate.  Although productivity changes are influential in the medium to long run,   3
so also are factor endowment changes, such as relative labour force growth, and demand 
switching policy reforms, such as trade liberalisation.  For similar reasons, short run 
movements in the real exchange rate prove to be dominated by financial flows on the balance 
of payments.  Thus, the net effect of China’s rapid economic growth on its real exchange rate 
depends on the sources of that growth and the consequent pattern of endowment changes and 
sectoral distributions of productivity growth and tradability.  Of considerable importance in 
resolving the puzzle is the short run impact of China’s widening current account surplus, 
which stems from its extraordinarily high total saving rate. 
This paper summarises recent research on the reasons for China’s stable real exchange rate, 
including modelling work that apportions changes since the 1990s amongst the strongest 
appreciating and depreciating forces.  The role of China’s macroeconomic policy regime is 
then reviewed.  It is argued that this regime is not mercantilist but rather averse to the 
exchange rate volatility that could stem from premature financial liberalisation while legal 
and institutional reforms to the commercial banking system are incomplete.  While ever the 
underlying real exchange rate is stable, nominal appreciations are undesirably deflationary 
and so the central bank maintains a correspondingly stable nominal exchange rate.  Beyond 
this, a central plank of the stabilising regime is capital controls, from which stem the other 
controversial element of China’s macroeconomic policy, its accumulation of foreign reserves.  
Their growth is forced by high savings, which cause China’s current account surplus, and the 
capital controls, which constrain the interest of commercial banks in foreign currency. 
Finally, the US pressure for faster RMB appreciation is discussed and further global 
modelling is applied to the issue.  Were it possible to relax the capital controls more quickly, 
reserve accumulation could slow as private holdings of foreign assets grow.  Reserve 
management could then bring about an underlying real appreciation, which would make an 
orderly RMB revaluation relatively easy.  Without this, however, a premature appreciation, 
brought about solely via a monetary tightening, would prove to be very contractionary in 
China and generally deleterious to the rest of the world.  An alternative approach would be for 
China to use border distortions like an export tax on manufactures.  This proves also to be 
contractionary in China and undesirable for its trading partners.  Moreover, interestingly, it 
would not necessarily narrow China’s current account surplus.  The gradualism preferred by 
the Peoples Bank of China (PBC) is therefore supported. 
The next section briefly reviews China’s real exchange rate puzzle and its resolution.  A more 
general treatment of real exchange rate determination is then offered in Section 3, where   4
elasticities to various determinants are calculated using a simulation model of the global 
economy and this model is used to decompose the path of China’s real exchange rate 1997-
2006 in search of the strongest appreciating and depreciating forces.  The role of China’s 
macroeconomic policy is discussed in Section 4 and scenarios for short term appreciation of 
the RMB are offered in Section 5.  General conclusions and policy implications are presented 
in Section 6. 
2 China’s real exchange rate puzzle 
If the nominal exchange rate, E, is defined as the number of units of foreign exchange 
obtained for a unit of the domestic currency, the real exchange rate, 
R e , can be defined 
correspondingly as the rate of exchange between the home product bundle and corresponding 
bundles produced abroad.  It follows that the bilateral real exchange rate for a focus (home) 
country with foreign trading partner i can be approximated as the common currency ratio of 
the gross domestic product (GDP) prices (deflators) of the two countries,  () ,
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This is the fundamental relationship between the real and nominal exchange rates.  Consider 
the case in which prices at home and abroad are measured in a common currency, the share of 
non-traded products in GDP, θ, is the same at home and abroad, prices are aggregated 
appropriately using a Cobb-Douglas index and the law of one price applies to all traded 
goods.  The latter implies that trade is costless and undistorted, so that 
TT
i p p = . Under these 
conditions, the real exchange rate becomes 


















From this, the key role of non-traded goods prices is clear.  When prices are measured in a 
common currency, or relative to a common numeraire, it is the ratio of the home and foreign 
non-traded goods prices that matters in determining the real exchange rate.   5
To illustrate the associated dependence on productivity, imagine that labour is the single fixed 
factor and that the rates of output per worker in the home traded and non-traded sectors are 
T A  and 
N A .  In trading partner i, the corresponding rates are
T
i A  and 
N
i A .  The relationships 
between the wage rate and product prices in the traded and non-traded sectors follow from 
equating the wage in both sectors with the values of the marginal products of labour in each: 
,
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ii i i i WA P A P WA P A P == ==, from which it follows that the divergence in wage 
rates between trading partners depends only on their tradable productivities: 
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If the non-traded productivity level is the same in all trading partners (
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Under the assumptions of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, then, an economy that is 
growing faster than its trading partners also has 1) faster tradable productivity growth 
( ˆˆ TT
i A A > ), 2) faster wage growth ( ˆˆ
i WW > ), 3) relative service price inflation ( ˆˆ
NN
i p p > ), and 
4) an appreciating real exchange rate ( ˆ 0 R e > ).  The hypothesis then implies that, if 
developing countries are poorer because their tradable labour productivity is lower, then their 
comparatively rapid growth should be associated with real appreciations against their richer 
trading partners. 
Support for the hypothesis requires, however, that all four of its predictions be observed.  For 
the case of China, that about productivity is examined by Tyers et al. (2006) by deriving 
Solow residuals for the economy as a whole and for three sectors: ‘Food’, ‘Industry’ and 
‘Services’.  They adjust the officially published urban employment data for its omission of the 
floating or non-hukou population, following Cai and Wang (2006).
vi  The average annual 
changes in the Solow residuals for each sector that emerge from this analysis are given in 
Table 1.  These show strong productivity performance by the Chinese economy since the mid 
1980s, with a slow-down in the 1998–2001 period associated with the East Asian financial 
crisis.  Consistent with other studies by Lu (2006) and Fogel (2006), productivity growth 
appears to have been strongest in the export orientated industrial sector and weakest in the 
largely non-traded service sector.
vii  When it is borne in mind that US productivity growth 
during the past decade has averaged no higher than three per cent per year (Gordon 2003, 
2006, 2007), China’s tradable productivity growth has clearly been comparatively high.   6
The second prediction, that of faster wage growth, is also supported by the data, as evidenced 
by the summary of sectoral real wage growth statistics in Garnaut and Huang (2007: Table 
2.2).  In 2000-2005, real wages grew on average by 9.9 per cent per year for rural workers and 
12.5 per cent per year for manufacturing workers.  The third, that of relative service price 
inflation, is also consistent with the BSH, as indicated in Figure 1.  The prices of construction 
and other services have clearly risen faster than the GDP price since 1990.  Yet, as shown in 
Figure 2, no such appreciating trend has emerged.  Indeed, as shown in Figure 3, if producer 
prices are compared between China and the US, a real depreciating trend is shown in the same 
period. 
3 Determinants of the path of China’s real exchange rate 
The resolution of China’s real exchange rate puzzle is to be found in the BSH assumptions.  
We begin with a critique of these and go on to analyse the wider determinants of real 
exchange rate movements using a numerical model of the global economy.  Finally, we use 
that model to decompose the forces affecting it in the period 1997 to 2006. 
Generalising the BSH assumptions 
Tradable productivity gap: During some periods and in some developing countries, 
productivity growth has been observed to be higher in the non-tradable sector,
viii leading to 
ˆˆ N N
i A A >  and tending to depreciate the real exchange rate.  Modern transport, financial, health 
and education services offer considerable potential for productivity catch-up.  Whatever the 
relative performance of China’s services sector in the past, recent evidence suggests 
substantial potential for catch-up and accelerated productivity growth in the future (Ma 2006). 
The law of one price for tradable goods: Failures of the law of one price have been observed 
for tradable goods in specific instances.
ix  Goods and services are not homogeneous across 
countries but are differentiated at minimum by country of origin.
x  Supply and/or demand side 
factors that raise the volume of tradable production move the home country down the global 
demand curves for its product varieties, reducing its supply prices and resulting in 
deterioration in the terms of trade and a depreciation of its real exchange rate.  Factor 
endowment growth and changes in policy that lead to substitution in demand for home 
products depreciate real exchange rates and the magnitudes of their effects depend crucially 
on the degree of substitutability between the differentiated products.   7
Labour arbitrage: In most developing economies, the marginal product of industrial labour 
exceeds that of rural labour due to the more rapid accumulation of industrial capital.  There is, 
therefore, a Harris-Todaro gulf between wages in the expanding and contracting sectors.  If 
labour mobility between the rural and industrial sectors is inferior to that between the rural 
and service sectors (particularly the construction sector), then industrial productivity growth 
does not necessarily drive up service wages or service costs.
xi 
Closed capital account:
xii The assumption that the real exchange rate depends only on 
interactions among countries associated with trade in merchandise is clearly violated in many 
of today’s developing countries, and particularly in China.  Its violation, in concert with 
failures of the law of one price for traded goods, means that any influx of payments (in the 
form of a foreign direct investment or portfolio capital flow) raises aggregate demand.  Since 
traded goods are supplied more elastically via imports than are non-traded goods—which 
depend on home resources—such an influx must raise relative non-traded prices and therefore 
appreciate the real exchange rate.  Conversely, effluxes will cause depreciation. 
Not surprisingly then, wider empirical evidence in support of the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis is mixed.  Choudhri and Khan (2004), for example, find favourable evidence using 
a small sample of developing countries that does not include mainland China, Taiwan or 
Hong Kong.  Bergin et al. (2006) find a positive association between price levels and real per 
capita income that is strong only in large samples of countries.  Miyajima (2005) uses a 
sample of 15 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
between 1970 and 2000 to establish that the hypothesis does not always hold during growth 
surges, which on numerous occasions were led by productivity growth in non-traded sectors.  
The East Asian evidence since 1980 also appears mixed.  Only Japan showed a rapid real 
appreciation following the demise of the Bretton Woods system in 1972 and in association 
with its correspondingly rapid export-led growth.  The same pattern is not observed for Korea, 
Taiwan or for any of the larger Southeast Asian economies.
xiii 
Another key potential driver of China’s growth is education and training.  Fogel (2006) 
emphasises this point, which is also well recognised by China’s leaders (as in the eleventh 
Five-Year Plan).  He shows that increasing secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios has a 
sizeable impact on the per capita GDP growth rate.
xiv  To the extent that services are skill 
intensive (as they are according to past data), this will boost performance in the service 
sector—again, tending to depreciate China’s real exchange rate.   8
Allowing for failures of the law of one price for tradable goods, there are numerous other 
forces tending to depreciate the real exchange rate in the long term.  During the past two 
decades one such force has been China’s ‘demographic dividend’, stemming from the high 
proportion of working-aged people in the total population.  This, according to Cai and Wang 
(2005), accounted for about one-quarter of per capita GDP growth between 1980 and 2003.
xv  
It has played a critical role in keeping wages and hence the real exchange rate low, thereby 
enabling the rapid expansion of labour-intensive manufactured exports.  In the future, 
however, the ageing of the population and the consequent decline in the labour supply will 
have the opposite effect, placing upward pressure on real wages and the real exchange rate.
xvi 
Modelling the impacts of growth shocks on the real exchange rate 
Here we examine quantitatively the relationship between shocks associated with China’s 
economic growth and its real exchange rate.  To do this effectively, a numerical model is 
required that is global in scope and that incorporates the generalisations of the Balassa-
Samuelson assumptions discussed above.  Recall that these included productivity growth in 
non-tradable as well as tradable sectors, departures from the law of one price for tradable 
goods, a more sophisticated representation of the labour market and an open capital 
account.
xvii  With these generalisations, almost all shocks to the economy have implications 
for the real exchange rate. 
We use a multi-region, multi-product dynamic simulation model of the world economy 
adapted from Tyers and Shi (2007).
xviii  It subdivides the world into 14 regions, with China 
defined to include Taiwan and Hong Kong.
xix  Industries are aggregated into three sectors: 
food (agriculture, including processed foods), industry (mining and manufacturing) and 
services (including construction)—the latter being little traded in comparison with the other 
two.  Failures of the law of one price are represented by product differentiation, so that 
consumers substitute imperfectly between products from different regions.  As in other 
dynamic models of the global economy, the endogenous component of simulated economic 
growth is physical capital accumulation.  Technical change is introduced in the form of 
exogenous productivity growth that is sector and factor specific, allowing the analysis of 
productivity performance that differs between tradable and non-tradable sectors.  Consistent 
with the results indicated in Table 1 for China, baseline productivity in food sectors in most 
regions grows more rapidly than that in services.  This allows continued shedding of labour 
by agriculture as part of the development process.
xx   9
Regional capital accounts are open and investors have adaptive expectations about real 
regional net rates of return on installed capital.  In each region, the level of investment is 
determined by a comparison of expected net rates of return on domestic installed capital with 
borrowing rates yielded by a global trust, to which each region’s saving contributes, adjusted 
by calibrated region-specific interest premiums.  Lagged adjustment processes ensure, 
however, that financial capital is not fully mobile internationally in the short term, but that the 
paths of domestic and global interest rates become parallel, separated only by exogenous 
premiums in the long term.  In representing China, however, one caveat is that no explicit 
control is imposed on the outflow of private financial capital.  General financial reform is 
represented by a diminution of the interest premium and this causes an unambiguous influx of 
financial capital to China. 
To augment the model’s characterisation of changes in labour supply and quality, it 
encompasses demographic and economic change.  It tracks populations in four age groups, 
two genders and two skill categories: a total of 16 population groups in each of the 14 regions.  
The skill subdivision is between production labour (unskilled) and professional labour 
(skilled).
xxi  Each age–gender–skill group is represented as a homogeneous sub-population 
with a group-specific birth and death rate, labour force participation rate and rates of 
immigration and emigration.  Because the non-traded sector is relatively intensive in skill, 
trends in skill composition prove to be particularly important.  These depend on the rate at 
which each region’s education and social development institutions transform unskilled 
(production-worker) families into skilled (professional-worker) families.  Each year a 
particular proportion of the population in each production-worker age–gender group is 
transferred to professional status.  The initial values of these proportions depend on the 
regions’ levels of development, the associated capacities of their education systems and the 
relative sizes of their production and professional labour forces.  Rates of transformation 
change through time in response to corresponding changes in real per capita income and the 
skilled wage premium.
xxii 
The 16 age–gender–skill groups differ in their shares of regional disposable income, 
consumption preferences, saving rates and labour force participation behaviour.  While the 
consumption–savings choice differs for each group, it is dependent for all on group-specific 
real per capita disposable income and the regional real lending rate.  Governments are 
assumed to balance their budgets while saving and borrowing are undertaken by the private   10
sector.  The baseline scenario is a ‘business-as-usual’ projection of the global economy until 
2030. 
Our focus is on how shocks that enhance the rate of GDP growth impact on the real exchange 
rate.
xxiii  The most significant of these are once-and-for-all productivity increases, skill 
transformation rate increases, interest premium decreases (increases in net financial inflows) 
and tariff decreases (increases in openness).  In each case, we run a new simulation in which 
the determinant in question is shocked once and for all, as of 2005.  We then extract the 
elasticity of China’s real exchange rate to each shock, tracking the values through time to 
2030.  We focus on the bilateral real exchange rate, measured as in Equation (1), between 
China (including Taiwan and Hong Kong) and ‘North America’ (including Canada and 
Mexico), since this best parallels China’s nominal exchange rate policy and the renminbi 
valuation debate.  The results are summarised in Figure 3. 
Sectoral total factor productivity: The elasticities shown represent the percentage departure of 
the projected real exchange rate for each percentage per annum increase in total factor 
productivity.  Because manufacturing is by far the greatest contributor to China’s trade 
industrial productivity is more significant for the real exchange rate than that of ‘food’.  The 
appreciating effects of tradable productivity increases are consistent with the Balassa-
Samuelson hypothesis and are, as expected, due to wage growth and relative service price 
inflation.  They are bolstered in the short term by increased investment and hence greater net 
inflows on the capital account.  In the long term, however, the enlargement of the industrial 
capital stock reduces costs and hence offsets the real exchange rate gains.  Also, as expected 
from the dominance of non-traded sector prices in Equation (2), faster service productivity 
growth depreciates the real exchange rate—modestly in the early years but to a dominant 
extent in the long term, when it is reinforced by associated capital accumulation. 
Skilling of the labour force: When the skill acquisition rate is increased in developing regions 
such as China, where the unskilled (or production) worker population is larger than its skilled 
(or professional) counterpart, the proportional boost to skilled workers is larger than the 
proportional loss of unskilled workers.  The result is greater output and, other things being 
equal, a real depreciation.  This tendency is enhanced by the fact that the services sector is 
comparatively skill intensive, so that the shock causes a relatively large boost to service 
output and hence a relatively large fall in the home service price (relative to North America).  
The result is a relatively large real depreciation in the long run.  The elasticities in this case 
are percentage departures of the real exchange rate for each per cent of the production-worker   11
(unskilled) population that is transformed each year.  Defined this way, skill transformation 
places downward pressure on the real exchange rate of a magnitude similar to total factor 
productivity in services. 
Financial influx: This is induced by a decline in China’s interest premium.  It raises 
investment and therefore increases aggregate demand and the real exchange rate.  A positive 
demand-driven effect is therefore expected in the first instance.  In the long term, however, 
when the effect of the investment on the capital stock is realised, the supply side dominates.  
More abundant and hence cheaper capital reduces production costs, yielding a real 
depreciation.  The elasticity to premium decline (financial capital inflow) is large and positive 
in the short term, with the lag to the switch in sign measuring at least 15 years. 
Trade liberalisation: This switches demand away from home-produced goods and services 
towards imported varieties.  For a single region, the supply of goods and services from the 
much larger foreign market is more elastic than that of home varieties, constrained as they are 
by local factor supplies and technology.  The effect of the demand switch, then, is to reduce 
the relative prices of the home varieties and hence to depreciate the real exchange rate.  The 
elasticity is constructed by dividing the percentage change in the real exchange rate by the 
percentage point change in the import penetration ratio (the ratio of the value of imports to the 
total value of domestic consumption).  The shock on which it is based is a marginal reduction 
in all China’s merchandise trade barriers.
xxiv  The elasticity, also shown in Figure 3, has the 
expected negative sign, and its magnitude grows through time.  The growth in the magnitude 
of the elasticity through time is due to increased investment and hence capital growth.  This 
occurs because the industrial sector, while it suffers from reduced protection, benefits more 
from lower tariffs on imported intermediate inputs.
xxv 
1997-2006 decomposition 
While the analysis in Section 2 makes it clear that the Balassa-Samuelson appreciating force 
has been in action in China, our generalisations allow consideration of countervailing forces 
and it is these that must have prevented any significant real appreciation between the early 
1990s and 2006.  Strong depreciating forces that might have caused this include skill 
acquisition, which helps control wage costs in the skill-intensive services sector, trade reforms 
and financial flows on the balance of payments. 
In terms of elasticities, Figure 3 confirms that financial flows dominate in the short to medium 
run.  From Figure 4, however, it is evident that, since the mid-1990s there has in fact been an   12
expansion in net outflows on these accounts, and so the effect has been to apply downward 
pressure on China’s real exchange rate.  To see this, note that the equality of net flows on the 
capital account
xxvi to the investment–saving gap follows from the standard aggregate 
expenditure and disposal identities.
xxvii  Defining net inflows as positive, the capital 
account
xxviii surplus can be written as: 
(4)  NF D KAS RIS =− ∆ = −  
where I is investment, SD is total domestic saving, SNF (net foreign saving) is net private 
inflow on the financial account and  R ∆  is the annual addition to official foreign reserves.  In 
the presence of capital controls, SNF is roughly equal to inward FDI.
xxix  Both sides of the 
equation are negative in the case of China, indicating net outflows.  Extraordinarily, even 
though investment accounts for 45 per cent of China’s GDP, more than half of its GDP is 
saved.  While these outflows have surely been a depreciating force, the other two candidates 
may also have been important.  The recent surge in overall income growth and urbanisation 
has seen an acceleration of skill acquisition and a boost to the service economy.  At the same 
time, the lead-up to China’s WTO accession saw a substantial reduction in trade distortions. 
To separate the effects of each of these forces on the real exchange rate we begin with the 
baseline model simulation over the decade 1997-2006.  This simulation incorporates all 
measured changes in sectoral productivity, skill acquisition and trade liberalisation.
xxx  
Finally, the trade reform shocks associated with the WTO accession are from Rees and Tyers 
(2004: Table 3).  The actual and simulated paths of the bilateral real exchange rate between 
China (incorporating Taiwan and Hong Kong) and North America (incorporating the US, 
Canada and Mexico) are illustrated in Figure 5.  Note, first, that these paths differ from that of 
the bilateral real exchange rate between mainland China and the US shown in Figure 2.  The 
real exchange rate depreciates further with these aggregations because Hong Kong and 
Taiwan experienced larger real depreciations against the US in this period and Canada and 
Mexico both experienced real appreciations against the US.  The simulated real depreciation 
falls slightly short of that recorded, yet, as the figure shows, the model does reproduce the 
shape of the observed real depreciation through 2006. 
The independent effect of each of the forces on the bilateral real exchange rate between China 
and North America is then discerned by making a number of additional model simulations 
over 1997-2006.  The first is a “no forces” simulation, in which changes to all of the key 
forces determining the bilateral real exchange rate are removed.  Saving rates are shifted to   13
ensure that the ratios of total investment to total saving in China and North America are held 
constant, restraining the expansion in net outflows on China’s capital account and net inflows 
on North America’s;
xxxi productivity growth rates in all sectors are set at North American 
levels throughout; no trade policy reforms occur; and skill acquisition rates are shifted to 
ensure that labour forces and skill shares grow in both regions at the North American rates for 
the period.  Then this no-forces simulation is augmented by each of the individual forces 
separately, to evaluate their independent effects.  The results are summarised in Table 2. 
Higher Chinese productivity growth offers the expected appreciating force.  Net financial 
outflows on China’s balance of payments and inflows on the North American balance of 
payments (their current account ‘imbalances’) both tend to depreciate the Chinese real 
exchange rate.  Similarly, skill acquisition and trade reform offer the expected depreciating 
forces.  In combination, the current account imbalances in both China and North America 
contribute a depreciation of more than five per cent by 2006.  Skill acquisition is a small force 
in the short run, consistent with the elasticities in Figure 3.  Surprisingly significant, however, 
is the depreciating effect of WTO accession trade reforms, which contribute more than four 
per cent to the overall real depreciation.  In the end, the current account imbalances prove to 
be, in combination, the most important depreciating forces during 1997-2006. 
4 Macroeconomic policy and the renminbi 
The exchange rate reforms launched by the Chinese authorities in July 2005 were intended to 
at least demonstrate a departure from the de facto fixed US dollar peg, nominally allowing the 
currency to fluctuate by up to 0.3 per cent each day.  The rate of appreciation has accelerated 
in 2007, with the daily band expanded to ±0.5 per cent from the “middle” of 15 qualified early 
morning bids.  To September 2007, the net nominal appreciation had amounted to about 10 
per cent.  Expressing a widely held view outside China, Lardy (2006:85) argued that: ‘As the 
world’s second largest surplus country, China must allow its currency to appreciate against 
the dollar and it must take steps to allow a transition to a growth path driven more by 
domestic consumption than by further increases in its external surplus.’  Consistent with this 
view, since the gross outflows on its capital account are dominated by reserve accumulation, 
China, in combination with other Asian economies that are also raising reserves, has been 
accused of ‘monetary mercantilism’.
xxxii  It is implied that reserve accumulation is chosen 
freely in order to keep the real exchange rate low. 
Are the “low” renminbi and reserve accumulation really discretionary?   14
In our view the monetary mercantilist critique is misplaced.  The root of its unfairness is 
evident from the identity (4) which transforms as  DN F R SI S ∆ =− + .  As long as total 
domestic savings exceed investment and capital controls prevent the matching of inward FDI 
by private outflows, ∆R must be positive.  The point is that, if the capital controls are justified 
on stability grounds, if the high private saving rate is impervious to macroeconomic policy in 
the short run, if government expenditure is already increasing so quickly that no quality 
expansion, and hence government dissaving, is feasible, and if investment is already too high 
at 45 per cent of GDP to permit additional projects that are of quality and manageable, then 
China’s current account surplus must be matched by reserve accumulation.  The PBC has no 
further discretion in the short run.
xxxiii  We consider each of the four conditions in turn. 
The capital controls are conceptually simplest.  They stem from “fear of floating” and short 
memories of the currency run with which China was threatened in the late 1990s during the 
Asian financial crisis.  Moreover, some PBC suspicions remain as to the prudential reliability 
of China’s commercial banks in exchanging large volumes of foreign currency.  Financial 
institutions are variously perceived as not sufficiently distant from decades of soft budget 
constraints associated with the channelling of government subsidies to state-owned 
enterprises through accumulated debt.  And there are concerns that the commercial banks lack 
access to derivative markets for currency and debt instruments to do the necessary hedging, 
though these are probably ill-founded in that futures markets are in establishment and these 
will quickly expand in significance once the stabilising blanket of capital controls is relaxed.  
Though their continued effectiveness is vouched for by Ma and McCauley (2007), the 
controls are slowly being relaxed, as indicated by the Qualified Domestic International 
Investor (QDII) and the Qualified Foreign International Investor (QFII) programs, which 
impose adjustable quotas on private financial flows. 
Next we turn to China’s high saving rate.  Household saving is high in China for three 
reasons.  The first is the transition from state to private employment and the associated need 
for households to prepare for costs previously borne by state owned corporations, namely 
those of housing, education, health and retirement.  Second, housing and health costs have 
spiralled relative to other prices in China in recent years, motivating still higher household 
saving.  Third, average household income is growing at an extraordinary rate.  Above-median 
incomes are increasing at more than 20 per cent per year.  The current surge is less than a 
decade old and its continuation is not likely to be expected, so that households are saving to 
smooth their income forward.  But all this explains household saving rates of around a third,   15
far short of total saving as more than half of GDP, indicated in Figure 4.  The difference is 
due to high and rising corporate saving.  In a recent study, Azziz and Cui (2007) point to the 
rising share of Chinese capital income in GNP as one important cause.  In turn, an important 
cause of this is very high corporate income growth in the nominally state-owned sector, 
particularly since 2000, as shown by Lu et al. (2007).  The majority of this has been earned by 
SOEs in traditional industries, including petroleum, refining, petrochemicals, coal, tobacco, 
steel and other metals, and transport equipment.  These firms are at least two-thirds state-
owned, with the remainder listed on stock exchanges.  Most are mandated monopolies treated 
favourably by the government in that, while dividends are paid to stock-holders, none is paid 
to the government.  The level of indirect and household income taxation is therefore larger 
than it would otherwise need to be, reducing the after-tax share of households in total real 
income and hence reducing consumption expenditure.  Critically, all these causes of the high 
saving rate are deeply structural and the subject of long term programs of microeconomic 
policy reform.  None is amenable to action by the central bank alone. 
Third, as noted by Xiao (2006), it has been suggested that the surplus of saving over 
investment implies that the rate of investment is too low.  At 45 per cent of its GDP, however, 
China’s investment is extraordinarily high.  It is difficult to imagine how additional projects 
might be conceived and implemented given service sector planning and facilitation 
constraints.  Moreover, China’s low official domestic financing rates notwithstanding, recent 
surveys by the PBC show that a very substantial proportion of investment still takes place 
through the informal sector at rates that remain high by international standards.
xxxiv  It will 
take some time yet for financial intermediation costs in China to fall to developed country 
levels and so financing costs must continue to be a break on investment.
xxxv 
Finally, China’s fiscal policy has to date maintained a fairly tight balance between revenue 
and expenditure.  Might not the government dissave to raise consumption expenditure?  
Public infrastructure investment absorbs a larger share of GDP in China than in any other 
developing country of comparable income per capita (Roland-Holst et al. 2005).  It is difficult 
to imagine faster growth in such expenditure without encountering the same quality barriers 
that constrain private investment.  Clearly, major reforms and institutional changes are 
required in the health and retirement insurance sectors.  Although such reforms do not require 
new building and construction investments, they are constrained by the process of 
institutional design, which in spite of China’s rapid growth, tends to be slow and careful.   
Liquidity and sterilisation   16
Through 2007 at least, the PBC absorbs foreign currency inflows net of import costs because, 
short of long term reforms affecting financial depth and while the capital controls remain, the 
Chinese commercial banks cannot move the required volume of foreign currency.  To avoid 
excess liquidity, annual reserve increments have been sterilised.  PBC holdings of domestic 
credit have been insufficient for this sterilisation, however, so ‘sterilisation bonds’ have been 
issued on the debit side of the balance sheet shown in Table 3. 
Just as the reserves have come to dominate the asset side of the balance sheet, sterilisation 
bonds have assumed significance on the debit side.  In effect, the PBC has acted as a conduit 
for domestic savers who might otherwise acquire foreign assets but are restricted from doing 
so by capital controls.  The current pressure from abroad to revalue therefore places the PBC 
in a difficult position for two reasons.  First, since the assets of the PBC are primarily in US 
dollars and its liabilities are in renminbi, too prompt an appreciation of the renminbi would 
result in substantial losses that would need to be covered in renminbi from the government 
budget.  This concern has very recently been addressed, at least in part, with the issue of US$ 
200 billion in government debt to be exchanged with the PBC for reserve assets, the latter to 
be maintained by China’s new “sovereign wealth fund”, the new state-run China Investment 
Company (CIC).
1 
As shown in Figure 7, this sterilisation process has kept a lid on the monetary base as a 
proportion of GDP.  Liquidity growth has nonetheless been substantial in recent years.  It is 
our view that this has stemmed from the on-going financial reforms, which have greatly 
expanded commercial bank intermediation (in place of pre-existing and relatively costly 
informal credit structures and credit cooperatives).  This has been valuable but the associated 
expansion in deposits has also boosted overall money supply growth, contributing since 2006 
to inflationary pressure.  Thus far, the PBC has responded with higher bank reserve 
requirements and higher short interest rates.  The latter has added to speculative (illegal) 
private inflows driven by the expectation that the RMB will continue to appreciate steadily, 
bringing upward pressure on the real exchange rate, as shown in the last year of data 
displayed in Figure 3.  The net effect has been a combination of inflation with the PBC’s 
modest appreciating trend for the RMB. 
The effect of relaxing capital controls 
                                                 
1 The new CIC takes the formerly-established “foreign exchange financial investment company” (the Hui Jin Co: 
literally translated as foreign exchange and gold) as its subsidiary.  Hui Jin mainly does equity investment in 
domestic financial industries while its parent company CIC will focus on overseas investment abroad.  Thanks to 
Bu Yongxiang for this detail.   17
As capital controls are relaxed, a key issue will be the extent of private outflows on the 
financial account.  Prasad et al. (2005) point to the potential for this to create a depreciating 
force as Chinese private investors seek to diversify their portfolios.  The scale of this force 
depends on whether the PBC’s existing foreign reserves are the equivalent of the private 
sector’s desired foreign holdings.  A crude assessment of this can be made by comparing the 
foreign shares of collective portfolios across developed and developing countries.  Assets are 
many and various and net positions are poorly documented, however.  For a sample of 
countries we have constructed a crude approximation to foreign shares in collective portfolios 
using estimates of capital stocks and recorded flows on balances of payments.  The results 
require a sceptical eye, since capital stocks are measured differently across countries and 
foreign shares can be expected to be higher in smaller and more open economies irrespective 
of their levels of development, as in the cases of Hong Kong, Singapore and the UK.
xxxvi 
The resulting foreign asset shares are listed in Table 4.  The countries are then ranked on their 
estimated foreign shares in Table 5.  Most striking is that, large official foreign reserves 
notwithstanding, China ranks rather low on the list, even when compared with other Asian 
developing countries.  Since 2002, however, its foreign share appears to have doubled and its 
ranking has risen.  By 2005 it ranked above Japan, Korea, Thailand, India and Brazil but 
below the other developed countries and Malaysia, Taiwan and Chile.  Its ranking above 
Japan and the other two of the world’s very large developing countries, India and Brazil, 
suggests its foreign share may be on the high side, though none of these economies is as open 
as China already is to foreign trade and ownership (Lardy 2006).  On the other hand, its 
ranking below the developed countries suggests that continued growth, combined with 
comparative openness, will take its share higher.  At the very least, these results do not lend 
clear weight to the thesis that financial liberalisation will automatically raise private inflows 
and appreciate the RMB.  Moreover, a surge in private rebalancing outflows could prove a 
healthy outcome since the PBC could readily offset this by repatriating its reserves and 
sterilising the inflow by liquidating its “sterilisation bonds”.  This would take the pressure off 
the CIC by restoring the PBC’s balance sheet to something more conventional as well as 
stabilise the home capital market. 
5 Unilateral appreciation scenarios 
The tendency toward real appreciation since 2006, indicated in Figure 3, may herald an 
appreciating trend.  Too little time has elapsed to tell.  Moreover, if there is an appreciating 
trend, and it is driven by speculative inflows, the recent crackdown on inward capital controls   18
will ensure that the effect on China’s real exchange rate is temporary and the flat path 
indicated in Figure 2 could be resumed for several years.
xxxvii  In what follows we imagine 
that the path of the underlying real exchange rate remains flat (as in Figure 2).  From Equation 
(1), any decision by the PBC to revalue would therefore require further monetary tightening 
and a reduction in the inflation rate.  Inflation above 5% per year offers some cushion to 
accommodate this.  Should the rate fall again, however, any significant revaluation would 
require a monetary tightening sufficient to risk a return to the growth-sapping deflation of the 
late 1990s. 
McKinnon’s (2004) sage preference for an East Asian dollar standard notwithstanding, the 
bilateral pressure by the US for an RMB revaluation is understandable in one respect.  The 
benefits accruing to the US economy from Chinese investment notwithstanding, its 
government perceives a substantial current account imbalance, a proportion of which stems 
from its bilateral trade with China, and it expects that a US$ depreciation will help to correct 
it (Woo 2006).  The US$ floats against most of the world’s currencies but, no matter how 
much it depreciates against those there have been limits to its flexibility against the RMB.  
This is the more frustrating because the monetary authorities of other Asian trading partners 
are concerned not to allow significant appreciations against the RMB.
xxxviii  Not only does the 
inflexibility of the RMB rate frustrate the US government, inciting the critical rhetoric 
(Bernanke 2006) and the draft legislation to “punish” China (Callan 2007), but it also causes 
frustration in Europe, where the burden of appreciation against the US$ is greatest.
xxxix 
Ironically, while the refusal by some other Asian countries to appreciate their currencies 
significantly against the RMB might well be motivated by “monetary mercantilism”, as 
argued in Section 4, we believe that the sluggishness of China’s appreciation against the US$ 
is motivated internally.  The sticking point is a fear of financial (including exchange rate) 
volatility and a lack of faith in its immature commercial banking sector to manage large scale 
currency exchange with due prudence.
xl  Although the PBC has no wish to hold additional 
reserves, it continues to accumulate them in order to avoid unnecessary reliance on its 
commercial banks (RGE Monitor, 2007c).  This bodes ill for the prospect of a partial 
repatriation of these reserves any time soon, since repatriation requires a significant home 
market for the exchange of foreign currencies for the RMB.  Yet such an influx, or at least a 
reduction in the rate of reserve accumulation, is an essential element of a healthy unilateral 
appreciation of the RMB.  Short of this, the Chinese government has two options: a 
substantial monetary tightening and a return to distorted trade.   19
Appreciation by monetary contraction 
Were a repatriation of reserves or an accumulation slowdown possible, the real exchange rate 
would appreciate (as discussed in Section 3) and the nominal exchange rate could then be 
allowed to appreciate without causing domestic deflation (Equation 1).  In the absence of 
reserve repatriation, and without any substantial upward movement in the underlying real 
exchange rate, the PBC could simply declare a higher US$/RMB rate.  This is the option 
advocated by Tung and Baker (2004), who suggest a 15% one-off revaluation and argue that 
the risk of consequent deflation is minimal, due to inflationary pressure from other sources.  
In the absence of an underlying appreciation of the real exchange rate, this argument lacks 
foundation. 
The defence of the stronger RMB would require a contraction of the domestic money supply 
(or a slowdown in its growth) and a boost to domestic interest rates and other financing 
barriers.  If the revaluation were as large as 15%, the result would likely be a return to the 
deflation of the late 1990s and this would squeeze profitability in the tradable goods sectors, 
leading to a slow-down in employment growth or an increase in under- or unemployment.  
Income would decline (or grow more slowly), as would consumption and saving.  Slower 
employment growth in the modern sector would reduce capital returns and, combined with 
higher financing costs, this would also contract investment (or reduce its growth), and so the 
implications for China’s external imbalance would then depend on the relative size of the 
saving contraction.  For external balance there are, therefore, two cases to consider. 
First, if Chinese households are optimistic they expect that the contraction is temporary and 
unrestrained growth will be restored in the future.  Faced with reduced current income they 
would then smooth consumption by reducing current saving.  Even with such a reduction in 
the saving rate, however, our simulation shows that the effect of lower employment growth on 
capital returns causes a larger fall in investment than in saving.  Total domestic saving is 
initially larger than investment, so the net effect is to reduce China’s current account surplus.  
This result is indicated in the first column of Table 6.  There is a real appreciation against 
North America and a slight reduction in the latter’s current account deficit.  In addition, there 
is a slight addition to North America’s politically sensitive industrial employment, though this 
comes at the expense of a service sector employment contraction due to North America’s real 
depreciation against China.  Both China and North America suffer losses in overall GDP and 
real income per capita.  The loss in China is substantial, however, amounting to almost a 
year’s growth.
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A second possibility is that Chinese households are pessimistic and believe that the 
contraction is permanent.  In response to the monetary contraction and reduced income they 
would then exhibit behaviour seen in Japan in the 1990s, smoothing their consumption 
forward and raising their saving rate.
xlii  As shown in the second column of Table 6, this 
exacerbates the contraction in Chinese economic activity and income.  Moreover, because 
saving does not fall and investment does, China’s current account surplus is raised.  The 
additional financial outflow causes a real depreciation, suggesting that, to achieve a particular 
nominal appreciation target, the monetary contraction in this case would need to deliver a 
larger deflation than before (Equation 1).  Internationally, this shock reduces global interest 
rates and raises North America’s current account deficit.  Even though there are small gains in 
North America’s terms of trade and real income, the exacerbation of current account 
imbalances and the associated decline in industrial employment would further frustrate the US 
politically.  It is difficult to conclude other than that there is little to be gained from RMB 
appreciation by monetary contraction. 
Taxing trade 
The other “unhealthy” approach to a unilateral appreciation is via trade distortions.  We can 
dismiss a rise in import tariffs as fanciful, since China’s WTO accession conditions offer very 
little room between applied and bound tariff rates.  In any case, the returns from the resulting 
openness have been so considerable that it is difficult to imagine any policy reversal.  Export 
restraints are possible, however, since these are not directly protectionist and hence would not 
attract mercantilist objections from abroad.
xliii  In principle at least, like import tariffs, they 
might be expected to divert domestic demand from foreign to home products and thereby 
appreciate the real exchange rate, allowing the central bank to also appreciate the nominal 
exchange rate.  The downside is that they would also be a tax on the most rapidly expanding 
sectors in the economy and so they would sacrifice growth in urban employment and income. 
Our simulation is of the short run (2010) impacts of an export tax of 15% graduated over 
2007-2009 and levied only on industrial exports.  As previously we consider scenarios with 
both optimistic and pessimistic households.  Surprisingly, as shown in the final two columns 
of Table 6, in both cases China experiences robust real depreciations against North America.  
This is because China’s current account surplus rises even in the optimistic case in which the 
saving rate falls temporarily.  This contradicts the expected story because that emphasises 
substitution in final demand.  The true story is about intermediate demand.  China’s export 
manufacturing sector relies to an extraordinary extent on imported components, mostly from   21
Asian trading partners.
xliv  When the export tax contracts this sector, imports are similarly 
contracted.  Total exports, in fact, contract by a smaller proportion because there is offsetting 
expansion in agricultural and service exports that are not intensive in imported inputs.  The 
net effect is an expansion in China’s trade surplus. 
In North America the current account deficit rises and, as before, there are only small changes 
in real GDP and real per capita income.  Importantly, however, China’s export restraints do 
raise North American industrial employment, again at the expense of services employment, 
even though North America experiences a real appreciation against China that would 
otherwise advantage the services sector.  In either case, at least in the short run, export 




The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is borne out for China, in that, relative to the US, 
productivity has apparently grown faster in the tradable than in the non-tradable sectors, real 
wages have growth faster and there has been relative service price inflation.  The flat 
trajectory of its real exchange rate between 1990 and 2006 is therefore a puzzle, the resolution 
of which requires the generalisation of the hypothesis to incorporate failures of the law of one 
price for tradable goods and a more sophisticated representation of the labour market.  This 
opens the way for depreciating forces that have been offsetting the Balassa-Samuelson effect, 
including net financial outflows on the balance of payments, trade and other microeconomic 
reforms and the rising number of skilled workers. 
To examine these forces, a dynamic model of the global economy is used to construct a 
baseline business-as-usual simulation to 2030.  The principal determinants of China’s 
economic growth are then shocked separately and their independent effects on the real 
exchange rate observed over time.  In the short term, the key determinant is net financial 
capital influx, which appreciates the real exchange rate, or efflux, which depreciates it.  In the 
medium term, scope does emerge for Balassa-Samuelson real appreciation, if services lag 
sufficiently behind industrial productivity.  In the long term, however, if services remain 
relatively skill intensive on average, their performance will be bolstered by both direct 
productivity improvements and skill acquisition, and the result will be a substantial 
depreciating force.   22
The model is then used to decompose the flat trajectory of the real exchange rate 1997-2006.  
The results suggest that the Balassa-Samuelson force is offset most strongly by the rise of 
China’s total savings relative to its investment and the associated expansion of net outflows 
on its capital account, with a significant contribution from WTO accession trade reforms.  
While much attention is paid in the literature to the “undervaluation” of the renminbi, it is in 
our view incorrect to blame this on China’s monetary policy and, in particular, to the PBC’s 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.  The PBC’s monetary stance is motivated by 
concern about financial (and exchange rate) stability in the face of the relative immaturity of 
its commercial banking sector.  While ever deeply structural issues cause China’s savings to 
exceed its investment, the reserves and capital controls merely alter the public–private 
composition of external financial flows but need not significantly affect their magnitudes. 
In the short term, unless the total saving rate falls suddenly, contracting the current account 
surplus, reducing reserve accumulation and appreciating the underlying real exchange rate, 
there will be no “healthy” way to unilaterally appreciate the RMB.  We show that unilateral 
appreciation by monetary contraction would be very costly to China, and it would most likely 
hurt the rest of the world by tightening capital markets and changing the terms of trade 
adversely.  Moreover, if Chinese households were to react pessimistically to the shock, the 
current account surplus could be enlarged, backfiring on those who clamour for an 
appreciation to address global imbalances.  The other conceptually feasible, but no more 
healthy, approach to a unilateral appreciation is via the imposition by China of a tax on 
manufactured exports.  As it turns out, because China’s export manufacturing sector relies so 
heavily on imported components, such a tax would actually exacerbate the trade surplus by 
cutting imports in proportion with manufactured exports while expanding other less import-
dependent exports.  This would increase China’s current account surplus while sacrificing 
considerable growth.  It would hurt the North American economy overall, though it would 
also raise the number of North American workers in politically sensitive industrial 
employment. 
In the near term, since without an appreciating trend in the underlying real exchange rate there 
is no scope for healthy unilateral appreciation of the RMB, international pressure would best 
be focussed on the remaining financial reforms and smooth transitions to policies that better 
regulate large state owned enterprises and address the need for uniform systems of retirement 
and health insurance.  China’s saving rate must eventually decline and this will reverse the net 
flow on its capital account, allowing non-speculative appreciating forces to dominate the path   23
of its real exchange rate.  In the long term, whether there is a sustained upward trend in 
China’s real exchange rate will depend on the relative strengths of appreciating forces, 
including savings and labour force declines, and depreciating forces that include the 
performance of its services sector. 
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a These are sectoral price indices for ‘Primary industry’, which is mainly agriculture; ‘secondary industry’, which 
is primarily manufacturing and construction; and ‘tertiary industry’, which is other services. 




Figure 2  The Mainland China – US real exchange rate on GDP prices
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a.  These are indices of nominal bilateral rates between mainland China and the US, deflated according to 
/
US
R YY eE P P =⋅ , where E is the nominal exchange rate in US$ per unit of local currency,  Y P  is the local GDP 
price and 
US
Y P  is the corresponding US GDP price. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (2007). 
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a.  Here the home prices are, for the US, the Producer Price Index and, for China, the Corporate Goods Price 
Index.  The Chinese index has more coverage of commodities and services, so this is a less than perfect 
comparison.  The implied real exchange rate is in black. 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics (2007), National Bureau of Statistics of China (2007). 
 
 




















a This is the percentage departure of the projected real exchange rate for each percentage increase in the overall 
import penetration ratio, M/C, caused by tariff reductions that began in 2005. 
Source: Simulations using the model described in the text.   30























a Since errors and omissions are large, we have adjusted the least accurately measured items in each sub-account 
(usually net factor income and net private flows on the financial account) to ensure balance. 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2007a. International Financial Statistics, April, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2007b. World Economic Outlook 
Database, April, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Some 2006 figures are derived from data from 
the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, 2007. Economist Intelligence Unit, Chinese National Bureau of 
Statistics.    31














a  Indexed departures from 1997, where China includes Taiwan and Hong Kong and North America includes 
Canada and Mexico.  The recorded series represents indices of  /
NAm
RY Y eP P = , where  Y P  is the China regional 
GDP price and 
NAm
Y P  is the corresponding North American average GDP price, both evaluated in US$ as the 
quotients of nominal and real regional GDP. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (2007) and, for Taiwan, from Central Bank of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) http://www.cbc.gov.tw/foreign/fx/minfo_07_4.asp; GDP Deflator; from Directorate-General of 
Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. (Taiwan); 
http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/data/dgbas03/bs4/nis93/np31.xls. 
 




















Source:  Peoples Bank of China.   32
 
Table 1: Estimated Chinese Total Factor Productivity Growth by Sector 
% per year  Whole 
economy 
Food Industry  Services 
1986-1989  3.5 1.4  3.8  3.8 
1990-1994  5.0 1.6  7.7  2.3 
1995-1997  5.7 5.5  3.7  3.2 
1998-2001  4.1 -0.2  8.9  -0.5 
2002-2005  6.0 5.4  6.3  4.6 
Sources: Analysis of Chinese statistics described in Tyers et al. (2006).  Original sources are, for output, 
China Statistical Year Book (2005), China Industrial Economic Statistical Year Book (every year after 1985) and 
China Statistical Abstract (2006).  Employment data are from China Statistical Year Book (2005), China 
Industrial Economic Statistical Year Book (every year after 1985) and China Labor Statistical Year Book (every 
year after 1985).  China’s capital stock, in 2000 prices, is taken from Holtz (2006).  Sectoral price indices are 
from China Statistical Abstract (2006).  Urban employment is enlarged based on underestimation proportions 






Table 2: Contributions to China’s Real Exchange Rate Change, 1997-2006 
 
Faster tradable productivity growth – Balassa Samuelson  +1.6% 
Faster skill growth  -0.6% 
WTO accession trade reforms  -4.2% 
Influx on the financial/capital account of North America  -0.4% 
Efflux on the financial/capital account (high saving rate)  -4.8% 
Net effect over 1997-2006  -8.1% 
  Source: Comparison of baseline with counterfactual simulations of the model 
described in the text. 
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Table 3  The balance sheet of the People’s Bank of China, ca. 2006
a 
Assets Liabilities 
Domestic credit, DC 
Central bank claims on depository and 
other financial corporations and on the 
central government 
20 per cent GDP 
The monetary base, MB 
Currency and bank reserves 
37 per cent GDP 
Sterilisation bonds, SB 
Debt to the Chinese public 
14 per cent GDP 
Official foreign reserves, R 
41 per cent GDP 
Other liabilities, OL 
Includes government ownership 
10 per cent GDP 
a As of mid-2007 the Chinese government issued new debt worth US$200 billion and exchanged it with the PBC 
for the equivalent from its stock of reserves.  The result was a substitution on the asset side of about 8% of GDP 
from reserves to domestic credit. 





Table 4  Estimates of the Foreign Share of Total Assets, Selected Countries
a 
Country  Ratio of Foreign to Total Assets, % 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
China  10 9  9 12  14  18 
Hong  Kong  55 56 55 59 60 64 
Japan  9  12 12 14 14 17 
Taiwan  11 14 17 21 22 24 
Korea  11 13 13 15 17 16 
Malaysia  22 27 28 38 36 41 
Singapore  48 50 51 57 57 58 
Thailand  18 20 19 19 17 17 
India  6  9  9  11 12 11 
Australia  15 17 17 18 19 21 
US  22 19 18 22 25 35 
EU15  30 33 30 34 36 47 
UK  63 63 52 54 54 68 
Brazil  5 6 8 8 7 5 
Mexico  7 8 7 8 9 9 
Chile  21 23 22 26 25 25 
a Shares are approximated as the quotient of foreign financial and physical assets and total financial and physical 
assets.  The numerator is the stock of capital owned abroad plus official foreign reserves.  The denominator is 
official foreign reserves plus the home capital stock plus the stock of capital owned abroad less that part of the 
home capital stock that is foreign owned plus M2 plus gold stocks.  International capital ownership is 
approximated, in turn, by dividing current account net factor income flows by long term bond rates. 
 
Sources: For most countries, foreign reserves, money supplies, gold stocks, net factor income flows on current 
account balances and long term bond rates are from the IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.  
For Taiwan these are from the Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 2006.  For Chile the money supply is from the 
Central Bank of Chile; for Australia it is from the Reserve Bank of Australia and for Singapore it is from the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore.  For China and India, bond rates are from Datastream and, for the EU15, 
Malaysia and Chile the bond rates are from the Economist Intelligence Unit.  All capital stock estimates are from 
the GTAP global database.   34
 
Table 5  Country Rankings on Foreign Shares of Total Assets 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
UK  UK  Hong Kong  Hong Kong  Hong Kong  UK 
Hong Kong  Hong Kong  UK  Singapore  Singapore  Hong Kong 
Singapore  Singapore  Singapore  UK UK Singapore 
EU15 EU15 EU15 Malaysia  Malaysia  EU15 
Malaysia  Malaysia  Malaysia  EU15 EU15 Malaysia 
US  Chile Chile Chile US  US 
Chile Thailand  Thailand  US  Chile Chile 
Thailand  US  US  Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan 
Australia Australia Australia Thailand Australia Australia 
Korea Taiwan  Taiwan  Australia  Korea China 
Taiwan Korea  Korea  Korea  Thailand  Japan 
China  Japan Japan Japan China  Thailand 
Japan  China  India  China  Japan Korea 
Mexico India  China  India India India 
India  Mexico Brazil  Brazil  Mexico Mexico 
Brazil Brazil Mexico  Mexico  Brazil Brazil 
Source: Rankings on the foreign asset shares in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 6  Short Term Real Effects of a Chinese Monetary Contraction and 
an Export Tax
a 
% departures from baseline  Monetary contraction
b  Export tax
c 
  Optimistic Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
China      
          Investment  -13.3  -17.8  -17.2  -25.4 
          Saving  -10.1  0.0  -12.1  0.0 
          Consumption  0.0  -14.2  0.0  -15.5 
          Current account surplus  -8.4  48.0  2.5  62.8 
          Terms of trade  1.1  -0.7  3.8  0.5 
          Real GDP  -7.5  -8.0  -5.0  -3.5 
          Real GNP/capita  -7.3  -5.8  -2.4  1.1 
          Real exchange rate, eR 1.8  -1.3  -4.8  -9.3 
North America      
          Current account deficit  -2.1  7.3  0.1  9.9 
          Terms of trade  -0.15  0.1  -0.6  -0.2 
          Real GDP  -0.04  0.13  -0.10  0.12 
          Real GNP/capita  -0.04  0.05  -0.14  -0.02 
          Employment in “industry”  0.14  -0.19  1.04  0.71 
                                   “services”  -0.04  0.09  -0.20  -0.07 
a  The shocks are implemented over the period 2007-2010 and the 2010 departures from the baseline simulation 
are shown.  Both shocks are implemented under two different assumptions about household intertemporal 
decision making.  The optimistic case has backward smoothing with a short run saving contraction while the 
pessimistic case has forward smoothing with a short run contraction in consumption.  In both cases investment is 
driven by the same adaptive expectations over capital returns, except that, in the optimistic cases, the annual rate 
of decline in China’s investment premium, which diminishes through time in the baseline scenario, is held 
constant for the three years of the shocks to reflect greater optimism on the part of financial investors. 
b  The monetary contraction is assumed not to be unaccompanied by reserve repatriation, so that it is 
deflationary.  It is sufficient to reduce employment by a cumulative 5% per year for three years 2007-2010. 
c  The Chinese export tax is applied only to industrial products and it accumulates linearly to a total of 15% over 
2007-2010.  No associated employment contraction is included with the export tax. 
Source: Simulations using the model described in the text.   35
 
                                                 
i The bill has sponsorship from Senators Baucus, Grassley, Schumer and Graham and, as of early July 2007, co-
sponsorship was extended to include presidential front-runners Hilary Clinton and Barack Obama.  The Senate 
Finance Committee approved the bill on a vote of 20 to 1 on 26 July.  See Callan (2007).  The US politics that 
lies behind this bill is reviewed by Woo and Xiao (2007). 
ii See, for example, Frankel (2004), Wang (2004), Goldstein (2004), Coudert and Couharde (2005) and Tyers et 
al. (2007). 
iii See, for example, Cline, W. (2005). 
iv See Tyers et al. (2006). 
v   Here we imagine that, rather than the continuum of tradability that is observed across goods and 
services, traded and non-traded goods are separated starkly as T, N. 
vi   The ‘Food’ sector is defined as Primary Industry plus Food Processing; ‘Industry’ as Secondary 
Industry minus Construction and Food Processing; while ‘Services’ is defined as Tertiary Industry plus 
Construction.  See Tyers et al. (2006) for further details. 
vii   Moreover, it must be borne in mind that services output volumes and prices are measured more poorly 
than those in merchandise sectors in all countries.  These comparative measures therefore carry large error 
margins.  Lu (2006) estimates labour productivity in China’s manufacturing and service sectors between 1978 
and 2004.  He describes the evolution of China’s manufacturing labour productivity after 1978 as a two-stage 
process: during the first stage (1978–90) it was only 1.9 per cent per annum, compared with a per capita GDP 
growth rate of 7.5 per cent; while during the second stage (1991–2004) it increased dramatically, averaging 13.1 
per cent—significantly higher than the official per capita GDP growth rate of 8.2 per cent.  Labour productivity 
in the service sector averaged 4.3 per cent per annum for the entire period.  Fogel (2006) disaggregates per capita 
income growth between 1978 and 2002 and shows that 69 per cent of growth was due to increases in labour 
productivity, which grew most rapidly in industry (6.2 per cent per annum), nearly as high in agriculture (5.7 per 
cent) and lowest, but still substantial, in services (4.5 per cent). 
viii   For example, the Cold War infrastructure investments in Korea and Taiwan reduced service costs at 
early stages in their periods of rapid expansion. 
ix   See, for example, Bergin et al. (2006); Crucini et al. (2005); and Drine and Rault (2005). 
x   This is a standard assumption in the most widely used numerical models of open economies and global 
trade. See, for example, Dixon et al. (1982); McKibbin and Sachs (1991); Hertel (1997); and Dixon and Rimmer 
(2002). 
xi Evidence for this is offered by Chang and Tyers (2003). 
xii Here the capital account is broadly defined to include all flows on the balance of payments associated with 
asset acquisition.  As such, it encompasses the more narrowly defined capital account, the financial account and 
official reserve transactions. 
xiii Japan is a special case in the East and Southeast Asian experience.  It was the first to develop rapidly but its 
economy, and particularly its services sector, remained far more closed than for its neighbours, and particularly 
relative to China. 
xiv For example, he calculates that if the tertiary enrolment ratio rose from six to 25 in the next 20 years (putting 
China where the Western European nations were in 1980), the growth rate of labour productivity would rise by 
4.4 per cent between 2000 and 2020, and that this would account for more than 60 per cent of the per capita GDP 
growth target set in 2002.  With the tertiary ratio increasing from 12.5 per cent to 19 per cent between 2000 and 
2004, if anything, his estimates could be too conservative. 
xv See Bloom and Williamson 1998 for a generic discussion of the demographic dividend in developing 
countries. 
xvi Golley and Tyers 2006 confirm this, finding that the non-working aged dependency ratio could rise to 43 per 
cent. 
xvii See note xii. 
xviii The model has its origins in GTAP-Dynamic, the standard version of which is a derivative of its comparative 
static progenitor, GTAP (Hertel 1997).  Its dynamics are described in Ianchovichina and McDougall (2000). 
xix The regions are Australia, North America (Canada, US, Mexico), Western Europe, Central Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, Japan, China, Indonesia, Other East and Southeast Asia, India, Other South Asia, Latin 
America, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East and the rest of the world. 
xx In the case of China, Wang and Ding (2006) recently estimated that there were 40 million surplus workers in 
China’s agricultural sector.  While underemployment is not explicit in our model, the assumption of high labour 
productivity growth in agriculture implies that agriculture is capable of shedding labour without consequence for 
its output as workers are drawn away by urban capital accumulation.   36
                                                                                                                                                          
xxi The subdivision between production workers and professionals and para-professionals accords with the 
International Labour Organisation’s occupation-based classification and is consistent with the labour division 
adopted in the GTAP Database. See Liu et al. (1998). 
xxii China’s skill share is projected to rise through time while that in its real exchange rate comparator, North 
America, remains static.  The contrast is due to North America’s higher initial skill share, its high rate of 
unskilled immigration and its higher fertility rate. 
xxiii Here we mirror simulations carried out by Tyers et al. (2006). 
xxiv The elasticity is insensitive to the scale of the liberalisation though not to the composition of China’s 
protection.  For the levels of protection embodied in the database for 1997, see Dimaranan and McDougall 
(2002). 
xxv This effect is discussed in detail in Rees and Tyers (2004). 
xxvi See note xii. 
xxvii The right hand side of this identity stems from the combination of aggregate expenditure on GDP, Y = C + I 
+ G + X + M; the fact that GNP is YN = Y + N, where N is net factor income from abroad; the GNP disposal 
identity, YN = C + T + S, and the balance of payments, BoP = 0 = KA + CA, where the current account is CA = 
X – M + N. 
xxviii For definition, see note xii. 
xxix China’s capital controls have been leaky but, as Ma and McCauley (2007) find, remain very effective. 
xxx The skill acquisition rates are calibrated using the model from wage and sectoral employment data, as 
described in Tyers and Bain (2007). 
xxxi In each region the model has 16 age-gender-skill groups each of which has endogenous saving, driven by real 
disposable income and the real interest rate.  Each group consumption equation has a region-wide shifter that is 
here adjusted to ensure that total saving accords with the imposed path of the current account deficit. 
xxxii The works mounting the monetary mercantilist position are reviewed by Aizenman and Lee (2006), who 
conclude in the end that China’s substantial reserves are more likely to be precautionary. 
xxxiii This is a general view also taken by Xiao (2006), who posits that “structural factors” and transaction costs 
cause China’s economy to adjust with a lag, implying that the current account surplus is not amenable to 
macroeconomic policy in the short run. 
xxxiv A general description of the results of these surveys was provided by Dr. Bu Yongxiang of the PBC. 
xxxv The effect of high financial intermediation costs on China’s growth rate is modelled by Tyers and Golley 
(2008b). 
xxxvi Moreover, contrary to our assumptions, net factor income flows on current accounts comprise more than 
asset returns and the rates of return on these assets are likely depart from long bond rates. 
xxxvii When our baseline projection of Figure 6 is extended beyond 2010, there is a continuous appreciating trend 
over coming decades, driven no only by Balassa-Samuelson forces but by an ageing-related decline in its saving 
rate and a slowdown and eventual contraction of China’s labour force.  See Tyers and Golley (2008b) and Tyers 
et al. (forthcoming). 
xxxviii There is evidence of monetary mercantilism in India and Southeast Asia, where appreciation against the 
RMB is seen as undesirable.  See RGE Monitor, 11 May 2007.  This link between China and other countries in 
Asia underlies the potential “domino effect” of an RMB appreciation, noted by Bergsten (2004). 
xxxix See RGE Monitor, 2007a. European rhetoric also represents this view, as in a speech by Pascal Lamy, then 
EU Trade Commissioner, on 23 December 2003. 
xl McKinnon (2006) offers a case for the avoidance of floating that depends on the negative interest premium 
China’s savers apply to foreign assets – they tolerate a low home interest rate to avoid exchange rate risk.  This 
risk only arises because of the declared departure from the US$ peg but it has the potential to drive the home 
interest rate low enough to cause a liquidity trap. 
xli The simulations described here are indicative only, since the model lacks a complete macroeconomic closure 
with forward looking expectations.  Even with full forward-looking macroeconomics, however, the self-fulfilling 
nature of expectations leads to some arbitrariness as to the selection of futures by the modeler.  Here we try to 
capture the range of possible impacts by simulating optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. 
xlii Ito (2001: Ch 11, 329-333) shows that, in the post Plaza Accord period the Yen appreciated substantially 
against the US$ and Japan’s current account surplus rose at the same time, even while real investment also rose. 
xliii Of course, the Lerner symmetry theorem suggests that a tax on exports is also a tax on imports, though this 
theorem is weakened in this case by open capital accounts. 
xliv An important empirical literature is developing around China’s role as an assembler of components made in 
other Asian countries.  Part of the reason for China’s bilateral trade surplus with the US is that this intra-Asian 
trade is reducing the bilateral surpluses of other Asian economies with the US while it exacerbates that of China.  
See, for example, Athukorala (2005, 2007). 